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Beyond ʽHaving a Domesticʼ?  Regulatory Interpretation of European Data Protection Law and 
Individual Publication 
 
Statutory Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) who act as the guardians of data protection across the 
European Economic Area (EEA) have faced unprecedented interpretative challenges as a result of the 
explosion of indeterminate publication by individuals in the form of blogs, social networking and 
other online forums.   Through both a questionnaire and systematic review of EEA DPA websites, this 
article finds that these regulators have generally adopted a strict interpretation of the law here, 
although considerable internal variation is also present.  Almost all see data protection as engaged, 
around half argue that publication in the general social networking context requires data subject 
consent and even when individual publication is targeted towards the collective public many DPAs 
demonstrate some reluctance to apply the special expressive purposes (aka the journalistic) 
derogation.   This article argues for an alternative tripartite approach under the forthcoming 
Regulation which accommodates the competing free expression rights and also the limited 
capabilities reasonably to be expected of private individuals on a sounder and more consistent basis.  
The law’s personal exemption should cover individual publication so long as this does not pose a 
serious prima facie risk to privacy or other fundamental data protection rights.  The special 
expressive purposes derogation should protect individuals who are disseminating a message to the 
collective public without discrimination.  Finally, the Regulation’s new freedom of expression clause 
should ensure that individual publication which principally instantiates self-expression is subject only 
to the core of data protection’s substantive and supervisory provisions. 
 
Keywords:  Blogging; Data Protection; Citizen journalism; Defamation; Freedom of expression; 
Online Abuse; Personal exemption; Privacy; Social Media.  
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1. Introduction 
 From its inception, European data protection has sought to create a common space for 
processing personal data within which “the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and 
in particular their right to privacy”1 are safeguarded.  Since the coming into force of the EU Data 
Protection Directive 95/46, this regime has also led to the mandatory creation and empowerment of 
statutory Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) across the European Economic Area (EEA).2  These 
regulators have become “the main actors protecting data protection rights”,3 playing a critical role in 
interpreting this legal framework.  Unsurprisingly given their protective duties, both data protection 
law and the DPAs have established a relationship of some tension with the freedom to publish.  This 
tension initially arose almost entirely in relation to the activities of organisations rather than private 
individuals.    However, from the early 2000s, the emergence firstly of blogs and later social 
networking sites has resulted in a world where anyone can with relative ease “communicate his or 
her thoughts to the entire world”4 with the consequence that “personal information is being posted 
online at a staggering rate”.5   These developments have presaged profound challenges for privacy, 
reputation and the structure of European data protection, resulting in an unprecedented 
interpretative dilemma for Europe’s information regulators, the DPAs.  Drawing on both an EEA DPA 
questionnaire and a website review, this article provides the first comprehensive empirical survey of 
how these critical actors have responded to this dilemma; building on this broad empirical base it 
then considers how legal interpretation could best evolve in the future under the forthcoming 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).6    
 It is found that EEA DPAs have generally adopted a strict approach to the application of data 
protection law to individual publication, although considerable variation between the different 
regulators is also evident.  The vast majority (although not all) DPAs hold that once personal 
information relating to somebody other than the publisher themselves is disseminated to an 
indefinite number, the personal exemption7 cannot apply.  There is also a consensus that the special 
expressive purposes derogation8 covers far from all forms of indeterminate dissemination, with 
many holding instead that it only protects forms of expression undertaken by individuals which are 
patently akin to that of professional journalism.   At the same time, there is a split between two 
groups of DPAs.  The first clearly recognise that the regulation of individual publication may unduly 
impact on freedom of expression and, therefore, seek explicitly to interpret legal requirements with 
                                                          
1
 Directive 95/46, art. 1.  See similarly article 1 of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1981). 
2
 The European Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46) extends not only to the 28 EU Member States but 
also to three associated states – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – which together with the EU make up the 
European Economic Area (EEA).  See EEA Joint Committee, Decision 84/1999 amending Protocol 37 and Annex 
XI (Telecommunication Services) to the EEA Agreement.  The precise relationship between the legal duties of 
these three associated states and related legal provisions such as the protection of data protection within the 
EU treaties remains a matter of great complexity, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
3
 European Union, Fundamental Rights Agency, Access to Data Protection Remedies in EU Member States 
(2013) (http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-access-data-protection-remedies_en.pdf), 9. 
4
 Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation:  Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (Yale University Press) 
(2007) 19. 
5
 Ibid, 29. 
6
 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/4/6/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
7
 Directive 95/46, art. 3 (2). 
8
 Directive 95/46, art. 9. 
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regard for this right, whilst the second instead presume that publication outside the special 
expressive area should be expected to comply with default data protection in full.  Within the latter 
group, the great majority go further and hold that in general only consent can provide a proper legal 
basis for publication.   As Van Alsenoy and others have argued, this has not only fuelled a strong 
“mismatch” with the “social practices of individuals”  but, at least theoretically, seeks to burden 
individuals with duties which are “excessively burdensome and unrealistic”,9 especially when viewed 
from the perspective of the fundamental right to freedom of expression.   In sum, the majority of 
DPAs have looked close to ʻhaving a domesticʼ10 with large swathes of individuals online, whilst a few 
others such as the UK and Ireland have developed equally extreme positions which appear to ignore 
the responsibility of individual publishers here entirely.  Looking to the future, the forthcoming GPDR 
provides the opportunity to develop a new tripartite approach which balances data protection 
against both competing free speech rights and the limited capabilities which can reasonably be 
expected of private individuals on a more consistent and sounder basis.   Firstly, interpretation of 
the personal exemption11 should be widened to encompass those forms of individual publication 
which do not pose a serious prima facie risk of infringing privacy or other fundamental data 
protection rights.  Second, a broad and non-discriminatory approach should be taken to the special 
expressive purposes derogation12 so that it covers individuals disseminating a message to the 
collective public.  Thirdly, individual publication which is both prima facie objectionable and 
predominantly aimed at self-expression and a general freedom to converse should, under the 
Regulation’s new freedom of expression clause, (only) be made subject to data protection’s core 
substantive and supervisory provisions.   The practical challenges of implementing this vision should 
not be underestimated and will undoubtedly have to involve not only individuals themselves but 
also services such as social networking sites which facilitate (and often mould, structure and 
aggregate) their publication activities.  However, only such a via media approach can ensure that 
Europe’s twin commitments to upholding both data protection and freedom of expression in the 
digital age is effectively realised. 
 The rest of this article is structured into five parts.  The next section outlines the key 
legislative, social, judicial and regulatory developments prior to the 2013 DPA survey.  Section three, 
which forms the empirical heart of this piece, details the methodology and findings of this survey 
both as regards the questionnaire and the systematic review of DPA websites.  The fourth section 
surveys judicial, regulatory and legislative initiatives subsequent to 2013 including, most 
importantly, the finalization of the GDPR.   The fifth section analyses this data and develops a new 
approach to better balance rights and capabilities in this area under the new Regulation.   Finally, the 
last section closes with some overall conclusions. 
 
2.  Developments Prior to the 2013 EEA Data Protection Authority Survey 
2.1 – The Pan-European Data Protection Legislative Framework 
 Data protection emerged in the 1970s consequent to the rapid development of computers 
and computerized networking.  From the beginning, Europe has been its legal champion.  A Council 
                                                          
9
 Brendan V. Alsenoy,“The evolving role of the individual under EU data protection law” (2015) 15. 
10
 The Urban Dictionary elucidates this British idiom as follows:  “When people are arguing, this is commonly 
known as ʻhaving a domesticʼ, no matter the seriousness of the arguement [sic]” (Urban Dictionary, Having a 
Domestic (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Having%20A%20Domestic)).  In this case, given 
that fundamental issues concerning freedom of expression, privacy and personal integrity are at stake, the 
matter under dispute must be considered quite serious. 
11
 Regulation 2016/679, art. 2 (2) (c). 
12
 Ibid, art. 85 (2). 
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of Europe Data Protection Convention was finalized in 198113 and in 1995 the EU adopted a 
framework Data Protection Directive 95/46 which was designed to “give substance to and amplify”14 
the Convention’s provisions.  From 2000 onwards, data protection has been recognised as a 
fundamental right within the new EU Charter,15 and in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon gave this 
instrument a legal status akin to that of the EU Treaties.16  Uniquely, the right to data protection was 
also separately set out in the treaties themselves.17 
 The European data protection framework as specified in Directive 95/46 is far-reaching.    
Materially, its default scope encompasses “processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic 
means” as well as in certain structured, manual filing systems.18   The key terms here are defined 
very broadly.  “Personal data” refers to “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (ʻdata subjectʼ)”19 whilst “processing … by automatic means” includes “any 
operation” performed digitally including collection, consultation, dissemination and even erasure.20   
Meanwhile, the law’s purpose is to establish a pan-European space for “protect[ing] the 
fundamental rights of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy”.21   This ambitious aim 
leads in turn to the imposition of wide and often deep default duties on data “controllers” defined 
as anyone “who alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing 
of personal data”.22  In sum, controllers must in general ensure that their data processing complies 
as necessary with a broad set of data protection principles including fairness, non-excessiveness and 
accuracy,23 detailed transparency rules  which set out requirements for ensuring the openness of 
processing vis-à-vis data subjects both on a proactive and retrospective basis,24 strict sensitive data 
rules which generally ban the processing of criminal, health, political opinion, ethnic and other broad 
categories of information within the private sector at least unless this prohibition has been waived 
by the subject,25 and a variety of disciplining provisions which seek to ensure that the core 
substantive elements of the law are not undermined by, for example, a failure to document 
processing, to maintain data security or to regulate the transfer of personal data overseas.26   
Turning to the supervisory system, although a right to a judicial remedy27 and individual 
compensation28 must also be made available, the establishment of one or more independent DPAs 
in each of the Member States constitutes the central and “essential component”29 of this system.   
These regulators, which must be endowed with wide-ranging powers of investigation and 
                                                          
13
 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (1981) (ETS 108). 
14
 Directive 95/46, recital 11. 
15
 EU Charter, art. 8. 
16
 TEU, art. 6 (1). 
17
 TFEU, art. 16. 
18
 Directive 95/46, art. 3 (1). 
19
 Thus, ʻdataʼ and ʻinformationʼ are treated synonymously and their conceptualization appears wide enough 
to encompass even innocuous details about an individual, even if these are already in the public domain. 
20
 Directive 95/46, art. 2 (b). 
21
 Directive 95/46, art. 1. 
22
 Directive 95/46, art. 2 (d). 
23
 Directive 95/46, art. 6. 
24
 Directive 95/46, arts. 10-12. 
25
 Either through explicit consent or through a manifest making public of the data by the subject themselves.  
See Directive 95/46, art. 8. 
26
 Ibid, arts. 17, 18-19, 21 and 25-26. 
27
 Directive 95/46, art. 22. 
28
 Directive 95/46, art. 23. 
29
 Directive 95/46, recital 62. 
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intervention, have duties to monitor application of the law, hear claims by data subjects30 and 
cooperate in the pan-European Article 29 DPA Working Party which is charged with promoting 
“uniform application” of the Directive across the EEA.31 
 Tempering this generally broad and stringent framework, the Directive also includes a 
number of exclusions and derogations which are designed to provide for a reconciliation with other 
rights and interests.  Article 3.2 sets out an exclusion not only for processing “in the course of an 
activity which falls outside the scope of Community law” – a provision which simply mirrors the 
Directive’s treaty base – but also processing “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal 
or household activity” (the personal exemption), with recital 12 clarifying that this is designed to 
shelter activities which are “exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence and the 
holding of records of addresses”.  Meanwhile, article 9 sets out a special regime for a particular sub-
set of freedom of expression, namely “the processing of personal data carried out solely for 
journalistic, purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression”, where it is stated that 
Member States should provide derogations if (but only if) “they are necessary to reconcile the right 
to freedom of expression with the rules governing freedom of expression” (the special expressive 
purposes derogation).  Finally, other clauses permit (rather than require) Member States to adopt 
derogations from the data protection principles and transparency rules in a “legislative measure” 
where necessary inter alia for “protection of … the rights and freedoms of others”,32 from the 
sensitive data rules in the “substantial public interest” and subject to “suitable safeguards”,33 and 
from the requirement to notify automatic processing with the DPA34 where processing is “unlikely, 
taking account of the data to be processed, to affect adversely the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects, they specify the purposes of the processing, the data or categories of data undergoing 
processing, the category or categories of data subject, the recipient or categories of recipient to 
whom the data are to be disclosed and the length of time the data are to be stored”35 (other limited 
derogations).  However, these latter clauses do not provide for the possibility of a derogation from 
key elements of the regime including the need for a legal basis for processing,36 the general 
provisions for ensuring discipline in processing37 and the system of both private and public 
supervision.38 
 
2.2 – Transposition of European Data Protection Exemptions and Derogations in Member State law 
 All Member States have transposed the personal exemption into their laws, the wording of 
which varies little, if at all, from that found in Article 3 (2) of the Directive itself.   However, five 
States (Austria, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein and Romania) do establish express and strict limitations 
                                                          
30
 Directive 95/46, art. 28. 
31
 Directive 95/46, arts. 29-30.  
32
 Directive 95/46, art. 13 (f). 
33
 Directive 95/46, art. 8 (4).  The requirements as regards lifting the default limits on processing data relating 
to offences, criminal convictions or security measures are slightly different and only require Member States to 
provide “suitable specific safeguards” (Directive 95/46, art. 8 (5)). 
34
 Directive 95/46, art. 18 (1). 
35
 Directive 95/46, art. 18 (2).  Member States are in any case meant to ensure that any person can demand 
directly from the controller (or other designated body) the same information (other than that concerning data 
security) which would otherwise be notifiable to the DPA (Directive 95/46, art. 21 (3)). 
36
 Directive 95/46, art. 7. 
37
 Directive 95/46, arts. 16, 17, 21, 25 and 26. 
38
 Directive 95/46, arts. 22, 23, 24, 28 and 29. 
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on when this may be relied upon if data is to be disclosed to others,39 whereas two others (Ireland 
and the UK) arguably seek to broaden it by express reference to an individual’s “recreational 
purposes”.40   Turning to the scope of the special expressive purposes derogation, much greater 
statutory diversity is apparent.   Fifteen Member States do mirror the Directive’s protection of 
journalism and literary and artistic expression in this regard.41  Four States (Denmark, Iceland, Malta 
and Sweden) go further and include some kind of broader reference to freedom of expression here.  
In contrast, twelve construe this derogation more narrowly by excluding literary expression (Cyprus, 
Italy), artistic and literary expression (Greece), any actor other than the institutional media (Austria, 
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein and Slovenia) or even fail to set out such a derogation at 
all (Croatia, Czech Republic and Spain).42  Finally, very few States have sought to utilize the other 
limited derogations to set out protections of clear relevance to individual publication.  The most 
important exception to this is Sweden which in 2007 granted a statutory exclusion from all 
substantive data protection for processing which “is not intended to be included in a collection of 
personal data which has been structured in order to facilitate search for or compilation of personal 
data” so long as this activity did not violate the privacy of the data subject.43   Meanwhile, under 
Netherlands’ law, controllers are absolved from compliance with both the transparency rules and 
the data protection principle prohibiting so-called ʻincompatibleʼ repurposing of data where inter 
alia this is necessary in the interests of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons.44  
Moreover, following an analysis carried out in 2007,45 the Netherlands granted a further “personal 
websites” exemption from notifying their processing with the DPA but only if data relating to any 
particular data subject is removed on request and in any case all data is deleted on termination of 
the website.46    
2.3 – The Definition and Development of Individual Publication: 
 The purpose of this article is to explore how data protection regulators have and should 
respond at an interpretative level to the phenomenon of individual publication.  ʻIndividualʼ here is 
understood to refer to a natural person acting within his or her private capacity rather than on 
behalf of a commercial, professional or organizational interest.47  As regards ʻpublicationʼ, it is 
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 Austria, Federal Act Concerning the Protection of Personal Data (DSG), s. 45; Italy, Personal Data Protection 
Code, s. 5 (3); Latvia, Data Protection Act, s. 3 (3); Liechtenstein, Data Protection Act, art. 3 (a); Romania, Law 
No. 677/2001 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free 
Movement of Such Data, art. 2 (8). 
40
 Ireland, Data Protection Act, s. 1 (4) (d); UK, Data Protection Act, s. 16.  It should also be noted that although 
one provision within Polish law expressly excludes processing of data by natural persons “for personal or 
domestic purposes exclusively”, another states that the legislation applies inter alia to “natural and legal 
persons and organizational units not being legal persons, if they are involved in the processing of personal data 
as part of their business or professional activity or the implementation of statutory objectives”, a phrasing 
which could imply that all non-business, professional or official activity by both natural and legal persons is 
outside the scope of this law.  See Poland, Act on the Protection of Personal Data, art. 3 (a) (1) and art. 3 (2) 
(2). 
41
 These are Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and the UK (including its intra-EU overseas territory Gibraltar). 
42
 For a full analysis including citation to all relevant legislation see Author (2015a). 
43
 Sweden, Personal Data Act 1998, s. 5 (a). 
44
 Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art. 43. 
45
 Netherlands DPA, Publication of Personal Data on the Internet (2007), 29 
(http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads_overig/en_20071108_richtsnoeren_internet.pdf).  
46
 Netherlands, Vrijstellingsbesluit Wbp, art. 38b. 
47
 Clearly, it is quite possible for an individual to pursue even on his own account a professional, commercial 
and organizational publishing activity and, therefore, fall outside the definition of ʻindividual publicationʼ set 
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recognized that this may be conceptualised very broadly.48  However, for the purposes of this article, 
‘publication’ will be defined as encompassing only those forms of dissemination which make 
information available to an indeterminate rather than a finite audience.49   Such a discrete focus is 
justified on the basis that the phenomenon of general publication (hereinafter publication) will, 
other things being equal, have a particularly serious impact on the privacy and related rights which 
data protection is committed to upholding.  The rise of this form of individual activity also raises 
particularly pressing issues as regards the need to ensure a coherence of legal and regulatory 
treatment with other actors’ activities including professional journalists and new online information 
services.  It is nevertheless recognised that more restricted forms of dissemination of personal data 
by individuals also raise significant privacy and related concerns and that, in very serious 
circumstances, the application of data protection even in more limited contexts cannot be ruled 
out.50  Further consideration of this issue, however, lies beyond the scope of this article. 
 Individual publication in the sense defined above is essentially an online phenomena.  Given 
that its origins can be traced back to the rise of bulletin boards and other forums in the late 1970s 
and 1980s51 it clearly predates the genesis of Directive 95/46 (although perhaps not data protection 
itself52).  Nevertheless, until the early 2000s, such publication generally remained a niche activity.   
Since then, the rapid development of firstly personal blogging and then online social networking has 
resulted in a radical qualitative shift.  As regards the development of personal web sites in the form 
of web logs (or blogs), Solove provides the following startling figures: “There were about 50 blogs in 
1999, a few thousand in 2000, more than 10 million in 2004, and more than 30 million in 2005.  By 
the end of July 2006 there were approximately 50 million blogs”.53   The later growth of social 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
out here.  Examples include acting as a professional freelance journalist or running an online forum or social 
networking site (even on a non-profit basis).  The application of default data protection provisions may breach 
other fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression in these contexts also.  Further consideration 
of these issues, however, lies outside the scope of this article. 
48
 For example, in UK defamation law, publication includes the dissemination of information even to one 
person who is not the person identified in the information or their spouse.  See Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 
Q. B. D. 635 (HC). 
49
 As per the e-Privacy Directive, dissemination only to a finite audience can be considered to constitute only a 
‘communication’ rather than a ‘publication’ of data.  See Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector, art. 2 (d). 
50
 In fact, it is clear that several DPAs have sought to develop guidance especially in the social networking 
context which would apply data protection norms irrespective of whether information is disseminated to a 
determinate or indeterminate number of persons.  Such a move, however, ought to be resisted since it runs 
the serious risk of intruding unduly on an individual’s private life and shackling them with clearly 
disproportionate burdens.  On the other hand, it may be argued that at least when manifestly inappropriate 
data is disseminated to a large body of determinate contacts, then a constrained interpretation of the personal 
exemption may be necessary to protect data subject rights.  An obvious example here would be revenge 
pornography.  If so, then a modified version of the legal structure forwarded in this article could be adopted 
such that the in cases of large-scale but determinate individual publication the personal exemption shields all 
but manifestly and seriously objectionable information (rather than the much lower threshold of simply prima 
facie objectionable information which would apply in indeterminate contexts). 
51
 As early as 1983, the Fifth International Conference of Data Protection Commissioners noted with concern 
that “the application of new media disseminated by cable networks may involve a considerable hazard to the 
personal right of privacy” because inter alia “[v]ideotex experience shows that suppliers and subscribers are 
publishing sensitive data on the new media” (“Preserving Data Protection in the New Media” (1984) 8 
Transnational Data Report, 416). 
52
 The first genuinely comprehensive data protection statute was adopted in Sweden in 1973.  For a translation 
see Paul Sieghart, Privacy and Computers (Latimer New Dimensions) (1976) 165-171. 
53
 Daniel J. Solove, Daniel, The Future of Reputation:  Gossip, Rumor and Privacy on the Internet (Yale University 
Press 2007) 21. 
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networking has been even more striking with Van Dijck noting that “[i]n December 2011, 1.2 billion 
users worldwide – 82 percent of the world’s Internet population  over the age of 15 logged on to 
social media sites, up from 6 percent in 2007.  Within less than a decade a new infrastructure has 
emerged, penetrating every fiber of culture today”.54 
 Both of these developments raise very serious new challenges as regards the protection of 
privacy and personal information more generally.  Thus, Solove again notes 
Many blogs are more akin to diaries than news articles, op-ed columns or scholarship.  
According to one survey, bloggers most commonly write about their personal experiences 
(37 percent), whilst only 11 percent blog about politics … In lieu of diaries, people are 
blogging.  And bloggers are getting younger and younger.  One news article reports that 
even seven-year-old children have blogs.  As people chronicle the minutia of their daily lives 
from childhood onwards in blog entries, online conversations, photographs, and videos, they 
are forever altering their futures – and those of their friends, relatives, and others.55 
Meanwhile Mann, perhaps with some hyperbole, argues that the development of online social 
networking has “conspired to invite impersonation, denigration, sexual or aggressive solicitation, 
cyber-bullying, and happy slapping to the members of social networking websites (SNWs).  The 
situation is serious – serious because the user-generated content (UGC) that is displayed on-screen is 
destroying users’ lives; serious too, because of the volume of users at risk from posting their 
content”.56  The 2016 annual survey of English teachers carried out by the NASUWT trade union 
drew specific attention to some of these problems, with those reporting having suffered insulting 
online comments or information from pupils and parents numbering 60% and 43% respectively.57  
Highlighting the sense of helplessness which can accompany such experiences, 63% failed to report 
perceived instances of online abuse involving pupils “because they felt no action would be taken”, 
whilst in 56% of cases no action was taken against parents for their postings.58  General Secretary 
Chris Keates commented at the launch of these results:  “Over the three years the NASUWT has 
been running this survey the situation has deteriorated … Online abuse is traumatic and potentially 
life changing.  Victims need strong support through a zero tolerance approach”.59 
 
2.4 – Court of Justice and Article 29 Working Party responses prior to 2013: 
                                                          
54
 Jose Van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity:  A Critical History of Social Media (Oxford University Press 2013) 
4. 
55
 Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation, 24. 
56
 Bruce L. Mann, “Social Networking Websites – A Concatenation of Impersonation, Denigration, Sexual 
Aggressive Solicitation, Cyber-Bullying or Happy Slapping Videos”, (2009) 17(3) International Journal of Law 
and Information Technology 252-267. 
57
 Although not reported at such a level of granularity, the NASUWT press release on the UK-wide results not 
only indicated a similar pattern but also noted with concern that “[o]ver the three years the NASUWT has been 
running the survey the situation has deteriorated” (NASUWT, Social media abuse endemic in schools, 
http://www.nasuwt.org.uk/Whatsnew/NASUWTNews/PressReleases/NASUWT_015430). 
58
 NASUWT, Abuse of Technology [England edition 2016]  6-7, 
http://www.nasuwt.org.uk/consum/groups/public/@journalist/documents/nas_download/nasuwt_014375.p
df.  It is clear that the vast majority of these comments (83% and 84% respectively) had been posted on the 
social networking site Facebook. 
59
 NASUWT, Social media abuse endemic in schools [UK-wide press release] (2016), 
http://www.nasuwt.org.uk/Whatsnew/NASUWTNews/PressReleases/NASUWT_015430. 
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 The relationship between Directive 95/46 and individual publication was first considered in 
Lindqvist (2003),60 an early and seminal case in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s 
data protection jurisprudence.    The case concerned the relationship between the Directive and Mrs 
Lindqvist’s publication on her personal website of “personal data on a number of people working 
with her on a voluntary basis in a parish of the Swedish Protestant Church”61 and attracted the 
intervention of the European Commission as well as that of three Member States.   Lindqvist argued 
that her activity was exempted by article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 and that in any case the Directive’s 
provisions were disproportionate and unpredictable and therefore “contrary to the general principle 
of freedom of expression enshrined in Community law”.62  The Commission rejected this and instead 
argued that, “given the purpose of the internet page at issue”, it constituted “an artistic and literary 
creation [sic] within the meaning of Article 9 of that Directive”.63  Whilst not endorsing that 
proposition, both the Netherlands and Swedish Governments argued that, since freedom of 
expression was clearly engaged, “the national court must endeavour to balance the various 
fundamental rights at issue by taking account of the circumstances of the individual case”.64  Finally, 
although essentially confining itself to technical aspects of the case, the UK Government implied that 
the general provisions of European data protection could legitimately apply in full here.65 
 The CJEU judgment clearly held that Lindqvist fell within the Directive’s provisions.  Article 
3(2)’s shielding of “purely personal or household activity” was confined “only to activities which are 
carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the 
processing of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that those data are made 
accessible to an indefinite number of people”,66 whilst its reference to “activit[ies] which falls 
outside of Community law” only covered the “activities of the State or of State authorities”.67   The 
Court also declined to agree with the Commission that article 9 was engaged.  However, in the 
process of rejecting Lindqvist’s argument that the Directive itself violated freedom of expression, it 
acknowledged that: 
Mrs Lindqvist’s freedom of expression … and her freedom to carry out activities contributing 
to religious life have to weighed against the protection of the private life of the individuals 
about whom Mrs Lindqvist has placed data on her internet site.  Consequently, it is for 
authorities and courts of the Member States … to make sure they do not rely on an 
interpretation of [the Directive] which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights 
protected by the Community legal order or with the other general principles of Community 
law, such as inter alia the principle of proportionality.68 
No subsequent CJEU case has directly considered individual publication online.  However, 
the Grand Chamber decision of Satamedia (2008),69 which centred on the commercial activity of 
making public domain tax income data on 1.2 million Finnish residents available via a hard-copy 
catalogue and mobile messaging service, did give extensive consideration to the scope of Article 9 of 
the Directive (the special expressive purposes derogation).  In sum, it found that “[i]n order to take 
                                                          
60
 C-101/01 Lindqvist, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil, EU:C:2003:596. 
61
 Ibid at [2]. 
62
 Ibid at [73]. 
63
 Ibid at [33]. 
64
 Ibid at [76]. 
65
 Ibid at [55]. 
66
 Ibid at [47]. 
67
 Ibid at [42]. 
68
 Ibid at [87].  
69
 C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. SatakunnanMarkkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, EU:C:2008:727. 
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account of the importance of the right to freedom of expression in every democratic society, it is 
necessary … to interpret notions relating to that freedom, such as journalism, broadly”; as a result, 
activities involving personal data processing must be considered as carried out “solely for journalistic 
purposes” if “the sole object of those activities is the disclosure to the public of information, 
opinions or ideas”.70  The Court also reiterated Lindqvist’s very limited construction of exceptions to 
the Directive set out in article 3(2), emphasising further that “the directive does not lay down any 
further limitation of its scope of application.”71 
 The Article 29 DPA Working Party (hereinafter Working Party) made an initial, albeit rather 
limited, intervention in its 1997 Recommendation on Data Protection and the Media which argued 
that “[a]rticle 9 of the directive respects the right of individuals to freedom of expression.  
Derogations and exemptions under article 9 cannot be granted to the media or to journalists as 
such, but only to anybody processing data for journalistic purposes”.72   However, it was not until 
2009 in its opinion on online social networking that the Working Party gave any sustained attention 
to individual publication.   Echoing Lindqvist, this opinion stated that, whilst “[i]n most cases, users 
are considered to be data subjects”,73 “[i]f a user takes an informed decision to extend access 
beyond self-selected ʻfriendsʼ data controller responsibilities come into force”.74  Whilst noting 
tangentially that users might benefit from “other exemptions such as the exemption for journalistic 
purposes, artistic or literary expression”75 and additionally that “[u]sers should, in general, be 
allowed to adopt a pseudonym”,76 the opinion argued that European data protection generally 
imposed very serious restrictions on publication activity in the social networking context.  Thus, it 
held that social networking site users should be “reminded that uploading information about other 
individuals may impinge on their privacy and data protection rights”,77 that (absent a Member State 
exemption) “[s]ensitive personal data may only be published on the Internet with the explicit 
consent from the data subject or if the data subject has made the data manifestly public himself”78 
and even that users should be advised that “pictures or information about other individuals, should 
only be uploaded with the individual’s consent”.79   In February 2013, and as part of its input on the 
                                                          
70
 Satamedia at [61].  The precise definition provided by the Court here was, in theory at least, confined to 
processing “relating to documents which are in the public domain under national legislation”. 
71
 Ibid at [46]. 
72
European Union, Article 29 Working Party, Recommendation 1/1997 Data protection law and the media (WP 
1) (1997) 8. 
73
 European Union, Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking (WP 163) (2009), 6. 
74
 Ibid, 6. 
75
 In such a situation, it argued, “a balance needs to be struck between freedom of expression and the right to 
privacy” (Ibid, 6). 
76
 Ibid, 13. 
77
 Ibid, 7. 
78
 Ibid, 8.  The Working Party did footnote that Member State exemptions were possible here.  It also deployed 
a purposive rather than literal meaning of the concept of sensitive personal data stating that “[t]he Working 
Party in general does not consider images on the Internet to be sensitive data, unless the images are clearly 
used to reveal sensitive data about individuals” (Ibid).  This would suggest that photographs which incidentally 
reveal a person’s ethnic or racial origins (as, in fact, all colour photography would appear to do) or information 
concerning their health or religious beliefs would not on that account only be considered sensitive data.  
Unfortunately (although understandably given the wide wording found in article 8 of the Directive) a number 
of courts have opted for a stricter approach.  See Murray v. Big Pictures, [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch); [2007] EMLR 
22 (overruled but not on this point); Hoge Raad (Netherlands Supreme Court), (23 March 2010) LJN BK6331.  
The need for a purposive approach is recognised in Recital 34 of Directive 95/46 which spoke of the sensitive 
data as “data which are capable by their nature of infringing fundamental freedoms or privacy”. 
79
 Ibid, 12. 
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now-adopted GDPR,80 the Working Party issued a statement on the personal exemption which was 
drafted by the UK DPA81 but endorsed by the Working Party as a whole.  In considerable contrast to 
its 2009 opinion, this statement argued that “the fact that an individual makes his blog or her social 
networking profile available to the world” should not be “determinative” of whether such activity 
lies outside the household exemption but should rather constitute “an important consideration” 
amongst many.82  It therefore developed a new multi-factorial test to determine the applicability of 
the personal exemption which it argued should be laid out in a Recital to the new GPDR as follows: 
This Regulation should not apply to processing of personal data by a natural person which is 
exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence, the holding of addresses of 
personal contacts or the use of social network sites that is outside the pursuit of a 
commercial or professional objective.  In determining whether the processing falls within the 
exception, consideration should be given to whether the personal data is disseminated to an 
indefinite number of persons, rather than to a limited community of friends, family 
members or acquaintances; whether the personal data is about individuals who have no 
personal or household relationship within the person posting it; whether the scale and 
frequency of the processing of personal data suggests professional or full-time activity; and 
whether there is evidence of a number of individuals acting together in a collective and 
organised manner.  The application of the exemption is constrained by the need to 
guarantee the rights of third parties, particularly with regard to sensitive personal data.  In 
this connection, account should be taken of the extent to which a natural person might be 
liable according to the provisions of other, relevant national civil or criminal laws, e.g. 
defamation.83 
  
3.  The 2013 EEA Data Protection Authority Survey 
3.1 – Survey Methodology 
 In recognition of the critical role Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) perform not only as an 
“essential component”84 of European data protection law but as its “guardians”,85 the empirical 
survey presented here sought to explore in detail the interpretative approaches adopted by these 
statutory regulators in each of the EEA Member States.  It was divided into two parts.  In the first 
place, in March 2013 a questionnaire was sent to both national and regional EEA DPAs86 with replies 
being accepted until the end of July 2013.   The questionnaire’s purpose was to capture the broad 
interpretative stance of these agencies as regards individual publication.  It therefore presented 
                                                          
80
 The contours of the Regulation will be dealt with in sub-section 4.2 below. 
81
 David Smith, “EU General Data Protection Draft Regulation” (2013) 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rgt_5h3Qemk) at 00:32-00:38. 
82
 European  Union, Article 29 Working Party, Statement of the Working Party on current discussions regarding 
the data protection reform package Annex 2 Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption for personal or 
household activities (2013), 9. 
83
 Ibid, 10. 
84
 Directive 95/46, recital 62. 
85
 C-518/07 Commission v Germany (2010), EU:C:2010:125 at [23]. 
86
 Regional DPAs have been established in the intra-EU British overseas territory of Gibraltar, the Spanish 
regions of the Basque Country and Catalonia and in each of the sixteen German Länder.  In the German Land of 
Bavaria alone, regulation remains divided between the public and private sectors.  In light of the focus of the 
questionnaire on essentially private sector matters and given the complication which a response from both of 
these regulators would cause, no attempt was made to contact the public sector regulator.  In the event, the 
Bavarian DPA responsible for the private sector also did not participate in the questionnaire. 
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them with the following two scenarios corresponding respectively to hypothetical activity by an 
individual blogger and a social networker respectively: 
 Individual blogger: “In his spare time, an individual publishes a blog that discusses and 
disseminates gossip about various celebrities.  It is freely available on the Internet and 
visited by several hundred people a week.” 
 Social networker: “A member of a Social Networking Site (SNS), the membership of which is 
generally open to individuals worldwide, ʻtagsʼ a photo of an identified individual and makes 
an informed decision to make this freely available to all members of the site.” 
Although free-text responses were also permitted, DPAs were invited to indicate in relation to these 
scenarios, which of the following statements was considered correct: 
A. Data protection does not apply. 
B. Data protection applies, but the activity in question must benefit from all the special 
derogations and exemptions for journalism, art and literature envisaged in Article 9 of 
Directive 95/46/EC. 
C. The general provisions of data protection law apply, but must be interpreted with regard for 
other fundamental rights including freedom of expression. 
D. The general provisions of data protection law apply in full. 
These statements sought to crystallize the four broad approaches put before the Court of Justice in 
Lindqvist.  In essence, they represent ordered options ranging from no application (A) through to full 
application (D) of the default data protection provisions.   
 Although useful for revealing the lay of the land, it was recognised that the questionnaire 
data would inevitably be broad-brush.  Therefore, to complement this, DPA websites were 
systematically reviewed for more detailed interpretative guidance related specifically to the 
individual publication.  Between March 2013 and the end of that year, the websites of thirty-seven 
DPAs were examined including those operating at the national level in all 31 EEA Member States and 
additionally those of the six sub-national regulators which responded to the questionnaire.  
Ultimately, as further elucidated in sub-section 3.2 below, it proved possible to categorize almost all 
the guidance collected into three broad groups, namely, (1) the potentially permissive, (2) the mid-
range and (3) the stringent. 
 Given that the DPA questionnaire data itself has already been written up,87 this section will 
focus on presenting the DPA website data and linking it back to that of the questionnaire.  However, 
before turning to this, the questionnaire data itself will be briefly summarized. 
 
3.2 – The EEA DPA Questionnaire 
 Responses to the two DPA questionnaire scenarios concerning individual publication online 
were obtained from twenty-nine regulators comprising twenty-three out of the thirty-one national 
DPAs (74% of the total) together with six regional bodies.   As regards both scenarios, twenty-five 
standardized responses were received (in two cases each with additional text specification) together 
with four free-text answers.  These results for each responding DPA are specified in the article’s 
appendix, whilst chart one and two below present the standard responses received as regards the 
blogger and the social networker scenarios respectively. 
                                                          
87
 David Erdos, “Data Protection Confronts Freedom of Expression on the ʻNew Mediaʼ Internet:  The Stance of 
European Regulatory Authorities” (2015) 40(4) European Law Review 531-562. 
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 Turning first to consider the blogger scenario, it is striking that despite the subject matter 
(“celebrity gossip”) overlapping with a certain type of (admittedly often salacious) professional 
journalism, only approximately a quarter of DPAs saw the special expressive purposes derogation (B) 
as being engaged.88  Instead, a clear majority (60%) saw this rather as an instance where general 
provisions data protection apply but must be interpreted with regard for freedom of expression (C).  
Only a small minority of DPAs selected either of the other options.89   The four free-text responses 
displayed considerable uncertainty as to how such blogging should be regulated, with two closest to 
the special derogation category (B),90 one to the regard for rights category (C)91 and one midway 
along the spectrum as a whole.92 
                                                          
88
 Moreover, although indicating that the special purposes derogation was applicable, the Estonian DPA 
indicated that the “practice” of the authority additionally took into account the criteria of interpreting general 
data protection with regard for freedom of expression (C). 
89
 Moreover, whilst indicating that data protection was fully applicable (D), the Cypriot DPA included two texts 
which appeared to qualify this considerably: “As a rule, the exemption of journalistic purposes (freedom of 
expression) should also be applied to persons who are not journalists by profession but publish data in relation 
to cases for which there is an increased journalistic public interest at the time of publication” and “Discussing 
gossips does not necessarily imply the processing of personal data.  Re-publishing personal data made publicly 
available by other media would not be in breach of the Law unless the Commissioner ascertains a 
contravention of the Law in line with section 4(2) of the DP [Data Protection] Law [of Cyprus].” 
90
 Thus, the Swedish DPA stated that the blog “would fall under the Data Protection Act, but only under a 
simplified provision – not the provisions in full” (which was interpreted as akin to (C)) or “could possibly be 
exempted” if done for “journalistic purposes” (which was interpreted as akin to (A)).  Similarly, the German 
Land of Rhineland-Palatinate DPA held that “[i]f it was only a private activity without journalistic importance” 
option (c) would apply but that if it could be classified as journalistic then data protection law would only be 
applicable to administrative processing rather than this activity itself (which was interpreted as akin to A).  In 
each case, the combined elements of the response averaged most closely to (B). 
91
 The Austrian DPA indicated that whilst a special section of the law regulated the relationship between data 
protection and the media (which was interpreted as akin to B), “[t]he regular Data Protection Act may apply to 
blogs and similar less regulated ʻmediaʼ” and if so data protection law would apply in full (D).  In this case, the 
combined elements of this response averaged most closely to (C). 
92
 The Slovenian DPA stated that data protection would apply in full (A) “if the published data is such that 
would be protected under data protection law, e.g. if it has been acquired from a data controller and 
published without legal grounds”.  However, “[i]f it is merely gossips, not originating from a certain data 
controller, the general law on defamation and breach of privacy applies [and data protection would not be 
applicable at all]” (which is akin to option (D)).   
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 Moving on to look at the social networker scenario, almost a majority (48%) of the standard 
responses held that default data protection must simply apply in full here (D).  Nevertheless, a 
sizable number (32%) saw this rather as a situation where general data protection had to be 
interpreted with regard for freedom of expression (C).  Moreover, although almost none saw the 
special derogation as applicable (B), a significant number (16%) held that data protection was not 
applicable at all (A), albeit with caveats in two cases.93   Meanwhile, although one free-text response 
related most to the regard for rights category (C),94 the other three displayed an (albeit ambiguous) 
reluctance to apply data protection law here and so were closest to option A.95 
 
3.3 – The EEA DPA Website Review 
Interpretative guidance related to individual publication was located on twenty-four out of 
the thirty-seven websites examined (65%), which included twenty-two (71%) of the 31 national DPA 
websites but only two (33%) of the six regional DPA sites explored.   Although both the extent and 
comprehensiveness of this guidance differed, in only two cases (namely, the Austrian96 and 
Lithuanian97 DPA websites) did the guidance prove impossible to categorize as a result.  In the other 
twenty cases, the guidance fell within the following three groupings arrayed according to the 
strictness of approach taken. 
  Firstly, six DPAs (27% of the grouped total) fell within a potentially permissive group (1) in 
that their guidance suggested that most forms of individual publication online should not be subject 
to data protection law at all (Irish, Slovenian and UK DPAs) or should be treated as essentially akin to 
journalistic/special expression (Finnish and Icelandic DPAs) or at least should not attract regulatory 
attention (Czech DPA).   Turning to more detailed consideration of this guidance: 
                                                          
93
 Thus, in additional text the Maltese DPA stated that “[a]pplicability depends on the type of profile and 
whether this is intended for personal use or for other purposes such as business, or to disseminate special 
news or information of a journalistic nature” whilst the Slovenia DPA noted that “[i]f the member is a data 
controller, data protection law might apply”. 
94
 Thus, the Swedish DPA response stated that “such publication would fall under the Data Protection Act, but 
only under a simplified provision – not the provisions in full”. 
95
 Thus, the Finnish DPA responded that “[a]pplication of the Data Protection law (Personal Data Act) depends 
on the purpose of the tagging”, the Polish DPA stated “[i]n general we consider that the SNS [Social 
Networking Site] itself is a data controller, and not the individual”, whilst the Slovakian DPA held that “Data 
Protection applies only in the case when a purpose and means of data processing are determined and such 
activity is performed systematically.  If these three conditions are not fulfilled the case of privacy infringement 
fall within the scope of the Civil Code”. 
96
 The Austrian DPA website included very limited information in a publication targeted at teenagers which 
simply stated that, similarly to the Press, individuals are responsible for anything they upload such as 
falsehoods, racist statements and pictures including in social networks and blogs and this can lead to serious 
consequences including fines or imprisonment.  See Austrian DPA, Du bestimmst … (2010) 
(https://www.dsb.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=38031).  This DPA was a questionnaire participant holding that as 
regards the social networking user example general data protection law applied in full ((D)) and that as regards 
the blogger example the law might either likewise apply in full or the provision in the law concerning 
journalistic purposes might be applicable (a free-text answer). 
97
 Relevant information found on the website of the Lithuanian DPA was confined to a press release on 
cyberbulling on Facebook in which the authority inter alia advised users to respect other individuals’ right to 
the protection of personal data in their use of the network.  See Lithuania, Valstybinę duomenų apsaugos 
inspekciją, Facebook reakcija į internetinėje žiniasklaidoje skelbtą straipsnį (2012) 
(https://ada.lt/go.php/lit/Facebook-reakcija-i-internetineje-ziniasklaidoje-skelbta-straipsni/28).  This DPA was 
also a questionnaire participant and held that as regards both the social networker and blogger examples the 
general data protection provisions would apply but must be interpreted with regard for fundamental rights 
such as freedom of expression ((C)). 
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 The Czech DPA held that individual pieces of information published in the context of inter alia blogs and 
social networks would in most cases lie outside the scope of statutory data protection intervention by the 
DPA since, it argued, the purpose of this law was to regulate systematic or targeted use of personal data
98
 
and under the principle of ultima ratio not just criminal but even administrative penalties could only be 
deployed if private action was inappropriate or ineffective.
99
 
 The Finnish DPA held, in the context of a complaint against a private person’s personal website, that as a 
rule data protection law should not be applied to articles and similar writings on account of this constituting 
an editorial or literary expression.  The law on mass media including its limitations would be applicable.  The 
DPA also stressed that freedom of speech protected publication regardless of the method used.  However, 
no specific guidance was found regarding publication in the rather different general social networking 
context.
100
 
 The Icelandic DPA argued that, as regards publication on the internet generally and Facebook specifically, it 
might be necessary to take into account provisions in Icelandic data protection allowing derogations “in the 
interest of” journalism, art or literature
101
 and that in any event a case-by-case balance between privacy and 
freedom of expression (as protected in the Icelandic Constitution and the European Convention) was 
required which it stated it was not competent to make binding decisions on.
102
 
 The Irish DPA held, in the context of its 2011 audit of Facebook Ireland, that (apparently irrespective of 
whether publication was indefinite in nature) “[u]nder Irish law where an individual uses Facebook for 
purely social and personal purposes to interact with friends etc they are considered to be doing so in a 
private capacity with no consequent individual data controller responsibility.  This so-called domestic 
exemption means for instance that there are no fair processing obligations that arise for an individual user 
when posting information about other individuals on their Facebook page.”
103
    
 The Slovenian DPA recommended in a 2009 leaflet concerning Facebook that users respect others and avoid 
publishing either data or photos without consent.  However, whilst noting that individuals have a 
constitutional right to privacy and other laws (harassment, defamation, undue image recording) might 
apply, it nevertheless held it had no direct responsibility here.
104
  Further guidance on data protection and 
the media highlighted this DPA’s peculiar understanding that data protection law solely applied to “personal 
data which is intended for its inclusion in a filing system”
105
 and would therefore only be triggered either as 
regards such “personal data collections”
106
 or where the data “had been illegally supplied from [such] 
collections of personal data”.
107
 
 The UK DPA in guidance on “online forums such as social networking sites, message boards, or blogs”
 108
 
stated that the household exemption would apply “whenever someone uses an online forum purely in a 
personal capacity for their own domestic or recreational purposes”
109
 and that it therefore “will not 
consider complaints made against individuals who have posted personal data whilst acting in a personal 
capacity, no matter how unfair, derogatory or distressing the posts may be”.
110
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 Czech, Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajůp, Zveřejňování osobních údajů na internet (2012), 1, 
https://www.uoou.cz/files/stanovisko_2012_13.pdf. 
99
 Ibid, 2.  The final paragraph of the guidance nevertheless stated that individuals nevertheless retained an 
ability to assert their rights through civil court proceedings (Ibid, 3). 
100
 Finland, DPA, Henkilötiedot yksityisen henkilön kotsilvuilla (2004) 
(https://web.archive.org/web/20111224022923/http://tietosuoja.fi/48518.htm). 
101
 See Iceland, Data Protection Act, art. 5. 
102
 Iceland, Persónvernd, Fyrirspurn um friðhelgi einkalífs og tjáningarfrelsi á Netinu (2010) 
(http://www.personuvernd.is/efst-a-baugi/nr/991). 
103
 The report even went on to argue that “[t]he Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2009 on online social 
networking also recognized this distinction”.  See Ireland, Data Protection Commissioner, Facebook Ireland Ltd 
Report of Audit 21 December 2011, 24 
(https://dataprotection.ie/documents/facebook%20report/final%20report/report.pdf). 
104
 Slovenia, Informacijski pooblaščenec, Kako uporabljati facebook ... in preživeti (https://www.ip-
rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/brosure/Kako_uporabljati_FB_in_preziveti_tisk__v2_-net.pdf).  
105
 Slovenia, Informacijski pooblaščenec, Media and the protection of personal data, p. 8 (https://www.ip-
rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/smernice/Media_and_the_Protection_of_Personal_Data.pdf) 
106
 Ibid, 7. 
107
 Ibid, 28. 
108
 UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Social networking and online forums – when does the DPA apply?, 
p. 2 (https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1600/social-networking-and-online-forums-dpa-
guidance.pdf). 
109
 Ibid, 3. 
110
 Ibid, 15. 
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 The rather amorphous understandings of law and regulation within this group is confirmed 
by linking this guidance back to rather divergent responses given by the relevant DPA in the 
questionnaire which rather often appeared in some tension with the published guidance. (This 
linkage was not possible in the case of the UK and Icelandic DPAs since they were not questionnaire 
participants).  The Czech DPA held that data protection was fully applicable (D) in the social 
networker scenario and that as regards the blogger it also applied but had to be interpreted with 
regard for freedom of expression (C).  Meanwhile, the Irish DPA selected this general balancing 
option (C) in both scenarios.  The Slovenian DPA held that data protection would be inapplicable (A) 
in the social networker scenario, but its free-text answer as regards the blogger essentially sat 
midway along the entire spectrum.111  Finally, the Finnish DPA held that the special expressive 
purposes derogation (B) would apply in the case of the blogger and in relation to social networker 
gave a somewhat ambiguous free-text answer which nevertheless came closest to the inapplicability 
of data protection (A).112 
 Secondly, another five DPAs (23% of the grouped total) were categorized within the mid-
range group (2) since their guidance suggested that, even within an ordinary social networking 
context, individuals could make personal information public without consent so long as this was 
judged to be harmless (Denmark, Spanish Catalan), not annoying (Greece), necessary and not 
overridden by the interests of data subjects (Netherlands) or not offensive (Sweden).  Information 
specifically flagged up for strict scrutiny comprised photographic images (Denmark, Greece), 
sensitive data (Netherlands, Denmark) and structured data (Sweden).  Additional protection for 
special expressive purpose processing was also sometimes highlighted, although in one instance 
(Netherlands) the test proposed appeared weighted in favour of professional as opposed to amateur 
activity.  Turning to a more detailed elucidation: 
 The Danish DPA, which confined itself to the social networking context, held that users should publish 
information with consent (or parental consent for minors) unless the data was “harmless” meaning “something 
so innocent that one would not normally feel that their privacy was infringed upon”.  Even such data had to be 
removed on request unless “you have a legal basis for not doing so” such as expression of “opinion in a way that 
is permissible in relation to freedom of expression” which is not “unlimited”.
113
  Portrait photos – any photo 
whose purpose “is to depict one or more specific people” – in any case required consent and the publication of 
private and sensitive information would generally require clear and distinct consent.
114
  Another part of the 
guidance did however state that data protection could “not be used to prohibit you from expressing your 
opinion” although it was stressed that “[y]ou must still refrain from disclosing the most private and sensitive data 
about other persons”.
115
 
 The Greek DPA published “tips” («ευμβουλές») on publishing information on social networks or forums which 
stated that users should not publish content that might “annoy” («ενοχλήσουν»).  The guidance for photos and 
videos was more cryptic (and potentially more severe) since one part stated that approval should be sought here 
whilst another stated only that potentially “annoying” («ενοχλητικά») publication should be avoided.
116
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 See supra note 92. 
112
 In sum, it stated that “application of the Data Protection law (Personal Data Act) depends on the purpose of 
the tagging”.  This might suggest if the purpose of tagging was not in any way professional or commercial then 
data protection would not apply at all. 
113
 Denmark, Datatilsynet, What you may disclose (https://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/social-networks/what-
you-may-disclose/). 
114
 Denmark, Datatilsynet, What you may not disclose (https://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/social-
networks/what-you-may-not-disclose/). 
115
 Denmark, Datatilsynet, When you disclose data (https://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/social-
networks/when-you-disclose-data/). 
116
 Greece, Greece, Αρχής Προστασίας Δεδομένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα, Συμβουλές για τη δημοσίευση 
προσωπικών δεδομένων σε υπηρεσίες κοινωνικής δικτύωσης ή φόρουμ 
(http://www.dpa.gr/portal/page?_pageid=33,147396&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL). 
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 The Netherlands DPA published an extensive guide to the publication of personal information on the internet 
which argued that such activity was legitimate if necessary inter alia for furtheringlegitimate interests not 
overridden by the rights and interests of the data subject.
117
   Otherwise unequivocal and rescindable consent 
had to be present which would in any case be required when publishing sensitive data not manifestly made 
public by the data subjects themselves.  The guidance emphasised that a wide range of duties would anyway be 
applicable including the data protection principles, proactive and retrospective transparency rules and overseas 
data transfer rules.
118
  Whilst acknowledging that a special laxer regime applied for exclusively journalistic, 
literary and artistic publication, the guide only set out an indicative, multi-factorial test for journalismwhich, with 
its emphasis especially on “regular activity”, appeared somewhat tilted in favour of professional as opposed to 
amateur activity.
119
 
 The Spanish Catalan DPA published guidance originally produced by an NGO (the Comisión de Libertades e 
Informátion) and aimed at 15-17 year olds which held that those engaging in blogs, forums and chats should 
always be respectful and tolerant of the views of others and should not insult, threaten or do anything that could 
harm others.
120
 
 The Swedish DPA held that, whilst information in a structured format such as a database (or derived from the 
same) generally must comply with data protection in full,  publishing or otherwise processing information in the 
form of running text or photos was permissible so long as this was not “offensive” ("kränkande”).
121
  Offensive 
data could anyway be published by individuals who want to inform, exercise criticism and stimulate debate on 
social issues of importance to the public as this would be covered by exemptions for journalistic purpose.
122
 
The focus on the need for a strict balance in this area was mirrored strongly in the linked 
DPA questionnaire responses (which were not received from either Danish or the Netherlands 
DPAs).   The standard responses from the Greek and Catalan DPA held, both as regards the blogger 
and the social networker scenarios, that general data protection interpreted with regard for 
freedom of expression was applicable (C).  The free-text response from the Swedish DPA was similar 
as regards the social networker but more permissive as regards the blogger.123 
Thirdly, a majority of some eleven DPAs came within the stringent group (3) since they 
suggested that, at least in the general social networking context which constituted the principal 
focus of the guidance, publication of personal information should be based on data subject consent.  
(In two instances (Norway, Italy) this categorization was only marginally made as there was also 
clear overlap with some themes in the mid-range group above).    In most instances a particular 
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 Comisión de Libertades e Informátion, Proyecto CLI – PROMETEO 2008/09 Manual Práctico 
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 Sweden, Datainspektionen, “Publicering på Internet” (http://www.datainspektionen.se/lagar-och-
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(Belgium, Estonia, France, German Schlewsig-Holstein, Norway) or even exclusive (Cyprus, Italy, 
Malta) emphasis was given to the publication of images, but in the other three cases the emphasis 
remained more general (Latvia, Luxembourg, Spanish Federal).  In at least five instances (Belgium, 
Estonia, France, Luxembourg, Italy) other protective aspects of data protection were also explicitly 
stressed, whilst in at least three (France, Italy, Norway) the special protections for sensitive data 
were noted.  Whilst stressing the default of consent, in approximately half of these cases (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Spanish Federal) the guidance did explicitly acknowledge that individuals could 
benefit from a more permissive regime for special expressive processing such as journalism.   
Turning to more detail on this guidance: 
 The Belgium DPA held that social networkers would need to secure the consent of third parties when publishing 
pictures or information about them and would additionally acquire general data controller responsibilities.
124
  A 
much longer and formal Recommendation on images provided detail on the same principle, arguing that for 
pictures targeted on particular individuals consent should be in writing and mention both proactive and 
retrospective transparency rules as well as rights to rectification and opposition.  Tacit consent would only be 
acceptable for photos incidentally including individuals and not affecting honour and good reputation.  A more 
permissive regime, however, was applicable to anyone performing a journalistic role including individuals.
125
 
 The Cyprus DPA held that publishing a picture or video of a third party required consent.
126
  However, when 
adjudicating on the YouTube publication of a video showing a conflict between journalists at a press conference, 
the DPA determined that even when not performed by a professional, activity such as this could fall within the 
journalistic derogation.
127
 
 The Estonian DPA stated that social networkers should not publish “other people’s information” (“teiste inimeste 
andmeid”) without consent, should not denigrate others and should not treat others as they would not wish to 
be treated.
 128
  Much more formal and extensive instructions were issued on the use of cameras stressing the 
same principle but with a special gloss for photography in public places
129
 and also with acknowledgment that 
individuals promoting a debate on a topic of public interest could claim the journalistic derogation.
130
 
 The French DPA’s guidance on both blogs
131
 and the publication of images in social networks
132
 stressed the need 
for consent and the right to oppose publication at any time.   The former also stressed the need to give 
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 Belgium, Commission de la protection de la vie privée, Réseaux sociaux 
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07E2B?OpenDocument). 
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(http://www.aki.ee/sites/www.aki.ee/files/elfinder/article_files/Suhtlusportaali%20kasutaja%20meelespea.pd
f). 
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 Estonia, Andmekaitse Inspektsioon, Juhend Kaamarate Kasutamise Kohta (2013) (accessed via 
http://www.aki.ee/et/uudised/uudiste-arhiiv/uut-kodulehel-kaamerate-kasutamise-juhis), 8.  In sum, the gloss 
stated that at public events tacit consent would suffice but that in other public places individuals should be 
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 Ibid, 14. 
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 French DPA, Blogs: la loi informatique et libertés s'applique mais ils sont dispensés de déclaration à la CNIL 
(2006) 
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information on rights such as access and rectification, that sensitive data should not be published on websites 
and that retention should be proportionate to the site’s purpose.
133
 
 The German Schleswig-Holstein DPA’s internet guidance stated a general rule that any private individuals 
(“privatperson”) had the right to determine what information was published about them and by whom.  Rights in 
relation to clearly identifiable images were particularly stressed, but with exceptions such as incidental inclusion 
and images related to contemporary history.
134
   Targeted social networking guidance repeated the same 
principle in relation to images.
135
 
 The Italian DPA’s guidance was confined to two decisions (from 2003 and 2005 respectively) concerning mobile 
phones with still photo
136
 and video
137
 capability respectively.  Both stipulated that general safeguards within 
data protection law apply, that those recorded must be informed, give written consent if the data was sensitive 
and by default provide consent in all cases (although the photo decision did state that certain (unspecified) 
statutory exceptions to this existed).  Both decisions also expressly noted derogations for “journalistic activities 
and non-systematic publication of papers, essays and other intellectual works”. 
 The Latvian DPA’s recommendation on social networking stated that publication of information about a person 
should only take place with their consent, defined as at least their implied understanding that they are aware of 
and don’t oppose this.
138
 
 The Luxembourg DPA stated that social networkers should ensure that information about others was only 
published with consent and that it be adequate and not slanderous, discriminatory or published out of context.
139
  
Other guidance stressed that data protection rights applied across the internet.
140
 
 The Maltese DPA guidance which focused on ʻstreet photographyʼ not only argued that image publication (as 
opposed to an image kept for a purely personal activity) would fall within data protection but strongly 
recommended that even for photojournalism “no processing shall be allowed without the informed consent of 
the data subject”.  Where this was not realistic, facial blurring to render the individual unidentifiable was 
recommended.  Failure to adhere to this could result in regulatory and/or civil court action.  The guidance did 
however note the need for a balance with freedom of expression and the relevance of factors such as the public 
or private nature of both the photo’s location and individual whose image was captured and whether publication 
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was in the public interest.  These comments implied some restriction of the consent (or blurring) requirement at 
least in a journalistic context.
141
 
 The Norwegian DPA advised social networkers not to share photos or information about others without consent 
and to be careful about publishing political opinion, belief and sexual orientation information which is considered 
sensitive.
142
   Detailed guidance on photography stressed that ʻportraitʼ photos required explicit and informed 
consent, that non-offensive ʻsituationʼ photos could in principle be published without this but that as it was 
sometimes difficult to differentiate between these categories or determine what might be offensive, consent 
should be followed as a rule.
143
 
 The Spanish Federal DPA’s internet guidance stated the general rule that individuals should not publish images, 
videos or any other record without the prior consent of those involved, but added that where individuals 
published as a journalist, the same duties and responsibilities would apply as for the professional media.
144
 
Relating this back to the DPA questionnaire returns (received from all bar the Spanish Federal 
and Norwegian DPAs), as regards the social networker scenario all held that data protection must 
apply in full (D) other than the Italian DPA which stated rather that an interpretation with regard for 
freedom of expression was required here (C) and the Maltese DPA which stated,albeit with 
caveats,145 that data protection would not apply here at all (A).   The blogger scenario responses 
were much more varied with five (Belgium, Estonian,146 German Schleswig-Holstein, Italian and 
Maltese DPAs) holding that the special expressive purposes derogation would apply (B), three 
(French, Latvia and Luxembourg DPA) that data protection interpreted with regard for freedom of 
expression was apposite (C) and one (Cyprus DPA147) that data protection would apply in full (D). 
 
4.  Developments Subsequent to the 2013 EEA Data Protection Authority Survey 
 In the process of finalising this article in February 2017, the guidance outlined above was 
rechecked and in all but three cases148 found to remain on the DPA’s current website.  This data 
therefore represents an essential empirical starting-point for analysis in this area.  Nevertheless, 
there are also some important recent CJEU judgments, further Working Party pronouncements and, 
most critically, the provisions of the now finalized GDPR to consider.   It should also be noted that on 
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24 June 2016, the UK voted by referendum to leave the EU, thereby casting into grave doubt the 
UK’s (and also Gibraltar’s) membership of not only EU itself but also wider EEA community.149 
 
4.1 – Recent Court of Justice and Working Party Developments: 
CJEU data protection jurisprudence has developed in an increasingly severe direction from 
2014 onwards.  In Ryneš (2014)150 the Court held that the personal exception had to be “narrowly 
construed”151 and therefore couldn’t extend to household CCTV which “covers, even partially, a 
public space”152 irrespective of whether the only onward disclosure was to the police. In coming to 
this conclusion, the Court especially stressed that “in so far as they govern the processing of 
personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy”, the data 
protection framework had to be interpreted in light of the fundamental rights now entrenched in 
the legally binding EU Charter.153  In Google Spain (2014), a CJEU Grand Chamber found a search 
engine indexing published content to be “controller”154 outside the special derogation safeguarding 
processing “solely for journalistic purposes”.155   It nevertheless suggested that search engines would 
only acquire data protection obligations where their processing “significantly and additionally” 
affects data subjects and even then only needed to act “within the framework of its responsibilities, 
powers and capabilities”.156  The Google Spain judgment was also strongly influenced by the need to 
interpret data protection in light of the Charter’s provisions.157 
 Guided by these developments, in 2015 the Working Party published a statement on the 
finalization of the GPDR which, in contrast to the reformist perspective in its 2013 statement, argued 
that “[t]he Working Party is in favour of a limited and carefully balanced household [or personal] 
exemption applying to ‘purely’ household activities as provided for in Directive 95/46/EC and 
interpreted by ECJ [European Court of Justice] case law”.158  Its opinion on drones, published at the 
same time, similarly backed a strict understanding of the personal exemption.159   The previous year, 
the Working Party also published guidelines on Google Spain which accepted that search engines 
were non-journalistic data controllers but held that certain limitations arose from the right to 
freedom of expression (specifically, in this context, of internet users wanting to obtain information 
from the service).160 
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4.2 – The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
 Initially proposed by the Commission in 2012,161 the GDPR was finally agreed in April 2016 
and will replace Directive 95/46 on 25 May 2018.162   This instrument reflected a belief that “[r]apid 
technological developments and globalisation”163 “require a strong and more coherent data 
protection framework … backed up by strong enforcement”.164  The Regulation therefore expands 
the Directive’s already stringent default substantive standards through, in particular, moreextensive 
provisions for ensuring transparency for data subjects165 and more discipline provisions especially as 
regards specifying arrangements between joint controllers166 and between controllers and 
processors.167  The data protection principles are augmented to include references to 
transparency,168 data security169 and controller accountability;170 the private and, more especially, 
public supervisory systems are also significantly enhanced (notably through empowering DPAs to 
initiate fines of up to €10M or €20M for most breaches of the law).171   Optional limited derogations 
for Member States continue but are generally subject to tighter specification172 and will no longer 
cover the data protection principles in and of themselves.  They also can’t limit either the discipline 
provisions or the supervisory system, both of which are subject to the expansions noted above.    
Turning to the personal exemption, the existing wording excluding only processing “by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity” is retained verbatim,173 but with a 
new Recital worded as follows: 
This Regulation should not apply to processing of personal data by a natural person in the 
course of a purely personal or household activity and thus without a connection with a 
professional or commercial activity.  Personal and household activities could include 
correspondence and the holding of addresses or social networking and on-line activity 
undertaken within the context of such personal or household activities.  However, this 
Regulation should apply to controllers or processors which provide the means for such 
personal and household activities.174 
Turning finally to provisions dealing with freedom of expression, article 85(2) sets out a slightly 
expanded version of the special expressive purposes derogation,175 with article 85(3) requiring that 
national laws adopted in this area be notified to the Commission.  At the same time, a new provision 
included in article 85(1) states more broadly (and cryptically) that “Member States shall by law 
reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to 
freedom of expression and information”. 
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5.  Analysis and Future of Data Protection and Individual Publication 
  The European data protection framework has from its inception been predicated on 
providing a “high level of protection”176 for individuals in relation to their privacy and related rights.    
Since 2009 this stance has been augmented by the inclusion of data protection itself as a 
fundamental right within the EU Treaties.177    It is in this context that EEA DPAs have generally 
adopted a theoretically strict interpretative approach to regulation here, even as regards the 
mushrooming phenomenon that is individual publication online.  At the same time, however, there 
is also a good deal of confusion and disparity even between the DPAs themselves, as well as a clear 
gap between most DPA guidance and social realities online.  On the one hand, an unduly stringent 
and bureaucratic approach risks attempting both to indirectly chill and even directly curtail 
legitimate rights to freedom of expression, as well as setting up legal standards which are impossible 
to practicably achieve.   On the other hand, and equally problematically, a failure to provide effective 
and appropriate safeguards may leave individuals without adequate redress in relation to very real, 
serious and growing threats to their rights, albeit emanating from other natural persons and even if 
now entrenched as purportedly acceptable social practices in parts of the online world.    From the 
point of view of data protection law, this tension potentially relates to at least three areas – (i) the 
special expressive purposes derogation, (ii) the personal exemption and (iii) other limited 
derogations which may be available for safeguarding freedom of expression.  It is also apparent that 
the impending coming into force of the GDPR provides an important opportunity to secure a more 
consistent and balanced approach to these important and challenging issues.   This section will 
therefore analyse all of the data presented above and seek to develop a more coherent 
interpretation as regards each of these three discrete legal aspects. 
 
5.1 – The Special Expressive Purposes Derogation 
 Given that the special expressive purposes derogation constitutes the only clause in the 
current Directive and still the principal one in the new Regulation which is explicitly designed to 
reconcile data protection with free speech, it makes sense to commence analysis here.   This 
provision currently shields processing “solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or 
literary expression”178 and in the future will shield processing “for journalistic purposes or the 
purpose of academic artistic or literary expression”.179  As an (albeit particularly permissive) 
derogation rather than a full exception, it mandates the establishment by Member States of a 
special regime which (within a certain margin of manoeuvre) ensures a balance between two 
competing rights.180   In referring to special purposes rather than special actors, it is not restricted to 
professional journalists, artists and academic or non-academic writers but rather is in principle open 
to everyone (a reality given emphasis by the CJEU in Satamedia) including private individuals.   
Although only approximately half of those DPAs which provided some guidance on individual 
publication addressed this issue, the great majority that did gave voice to this crucial liberal 
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democratic point.  In contrast, in the DPA questionnaire only a minority181 accepted that the 
individual in the blogger scenario fell within this, notwithstanding that they were disseminating 
material (“celebrity gossip”) which is widely recognised as journalistic when carried out by the 
professional media.182   The GDPR’s apparent removal of the requirement that processing be 
conceptualized as “solely”183 for the special expressive purposes as well its general emphasis on 
construing this clause “broadly”184 provides an opportunity to decisively reject such prioritization of 
expression by actors with a particular professional status.   Nevertheless, whilst wider than just 
journalism (let alone professional as opposed to ʻcitizenʼ journalism), the clause rightly remains tied 
to the pursuit of expressive purposes which, in principle, have a particularly strong social value.   
Publication which aims at the dissemination of a message (“information, opinions or ideas”185) to the 
collective public, including not only those which are narrowly journalistic but also those which 
instantiate an artistic, literary and now also an academic purpose, should be safeguarded under this 
derogation.   Nevertheless, many forms of individual publication online fail to instantiate such 
purposes.186   Thus, not only are a good number of blogs “more akin to diaries than news articles, op-
ed columns or scholarship”187 but most forms of social networking are either exclusively or very 
predominantly concerned only with self-expression and a linked general freedom to converse.  Like 
search engine indexing in Google Spain, these forms of processing cannot fall within a reasonable 
interpretation of the special expressive purposes derogation even if generously construed. 
 
5.2 – The Personal Exemption 
 The strong focus on self-expression in many cases of individual publication may suggest that 
data protection’s personal exemption should apply here.  In general, however, current DPA 
interpretation firmly rejects this.  Thus, only a small minority of DPAs (12% and 16% respectively) 
who provided standard responses to the blogger and social networker questionnaire scenarios held 
that such activity would be exempt (see Charts 1 and 2 above).  Similarly, as regards the published 
guidance, not only did only around half of those falling within potentially permissive group (itself 
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only 27% of the DPA total) clearly suggest that self-expression might be fully exempt,188 but the 
guidance falling within the other groupings was grounded on the notion articulated in Lindqvist that 
all indeterminate publication of personal information (at least if related to third parties) necessarily 
fell within data protection’s scope.  Such an understanding similarly underpinned the Working 
Party’s opinion on social networking from 2009 and strongly influenced its 2015 statement on the 
GPDR and its opinion on drones.  On the other hand, the Working Party’s 2013 statement clearly 
supported some deployment of the personal exemption in this area.   Moreover, at least three 
arguments do support a wide role for the personal exemption here.  Firstly, the numerous 
substantive and also procedural duties which default data protection would impose on controllers 
are challenging even in relation to large organizations; in the context of individuals they therefore 
pose an acute risk of being highly disproportionate or even impossible to discharge.189    Secondly, 
self-expression and the linked freedom to converse further vitally important human values, notably 
the “right to identity and personal development”.190    It is therefore vital to take fully into account 
the impact which legal restrictions may have on such values,191 even if existing freedom of 
expression jurisprudence does not fully do so yet.192  Thirdly, given the explosion of the individual 
publication online, the application of data protection framework in this area poses a serious and 
growing “logistical challenge”193 especially for DPAs and in particular if they are expected to respond 
in full to each and every complaint made.     
At the same time, however, there are also strong arguments against expanding the scope of 
the personal exemption to cover individual publication in general.  First and foremost, as explored in 
section 2.2 above, in an age of ubiquitous networked computing such activity can seriously 
undermine an individual’s right to the protection of personal information.    It is true that, as the 
Working Party’s 2013 statement pointed out, a variety of other national laws do play a role within 
this space.194 However, these laws remain entirely unharmonized and, when analysed from the 
perspective of data protection, may suffer from fairly obvious deficiencies.  To take one example, 
English defamation law includes a ʻsingle publication ruleʼ which generally prohibits a claimant 
pursuing a remedy for the ongoing publication of defamatory information if that information was 
                                                          
188
 Such a categorical approach was clearly present in the case of the UK and arguably also present in the case 
of Finland, Ireland and Slovenia.  In contrast, the Czech and Icelandic guidance clearly still sought to apply data 
protection to some extent even within this context. 
189
 See Brendan Van Alsenoy, “The evolving role of the individual under EU data protection law”, 15. 
190
 P. G. and J. H. v United Kingdom (44787/98) (2001) at [56].   It is striking that judicial recognition of these 
values has been forthcoming so far not in a freedom of expression context but rather in cases involving the 
protection of private life. 
191
 In this context, the Article 29 Working Party’s 2013 statement rightly “notes the positive impact of much 
online data processing done by natural persons – in terms for example of cultural exchange, the development 
of new forms of discourse and democratisation” and rightly argued that “[d]ata protection law must be applied 
in a way that these positive aspects of individual’s personal use of the online world are allowed to flourish” 
(European Union, Article 29 Working Party, Statement of the Working Party on Current Discussions, 2). 
192
 This current deficiency may be explained both by the narrow institutional nature of most freedom of 
expression jurisprudence (see e.g. “almost all free expression jurisprudence is, today, media jurisprudence” 
(Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom Under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University Press 
2006), 2) and by the fact that high impact individual publication has only become a widespread phenomenon 
relatively recently and so litigation in this area is in many respects embryonic. 
193
 European Union, Article 29 Working Party, Statement of the Working Party on Current Discussions, 7. 
194
 The Working Party noted laws relating to libel, harassment, malicious communications, threatening 
behaviour, incitement, persecution and discrimination (European Commission, Article 29 Working Party, 
Statement of the Working Party on Current Discussions, 6).  However, other legal provisions which appear 
clearly relevant are general protections in tort law relating to the protection of private life and, in many 
jurisdictions, also one’s image. 
26 
 
initially published more than one year previously.195  This conflicts markedly not only with data 
protection’s understanding that electronic publication is an ongoing ʻprocessingʼ activity but also 
that the passage of time may be an aggravating rather than mitigating factor when assessing the 
legality of continuing to publish stigmatic material relating to an individual.196   Procedurally, these 
laws also fail to provide a cognate to the DPAs which, at least in serious cases, should provide 
assistance to data subjects in their quest for a vindication of rights -  redress which in many 
jurisdictions otherwise entails the risk of very considerable legal expense.197   Secondly, and 
relatedly, European data protection law’s broad safeguarding purpose –  encapsulated in Google 
Spain as ensuring the “effective and complete protection of data subjects, in particular of their right 
to privacy”198  -  could simply not be achieved if a general and absolute exemption was provided for 
the individual publication of personal data.  To the contrary, as Xanthoulis argues: 
[T]he granting of a full exemption from data protection requirements to any user who 
uploads materials on the internet as a private individual would lead to easy circumvention of 
the rules and, in an age of UGC [User Generated Content], would fundamentally undermine 
data protection and privacy itself.199 
It must be an imperative to avoid an interpretation of the law which would lead to such a result.200  
Thirdly, the GDPR’s continued exclusion only of processing “by a natural person in the course of a 
purely personal or household activity” places strong limits on a broad construction of the personal 
exemption.  It is true that any reasonable interpretation of this provision in today’s reality requires 
the adoption of a purposive rather than strictly black-letter approach.  Thus, a rigid interpretation of 
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the phrase “by a natural person” (rather than the broader one of “by or on behalf of a natural 
person”) may suggest that the individual themselves must directly carry out the processing 
operations using his or her own equipment (e.g. a personal computer or mobile phone) rather than 
delegating this to a processor acting under their instruction (e.g. an online platform contractually 
limited to providing access only to a restricted number of persons predetermined by the 
individual).201  Similarly, the CJEU’s Lindqvist holding that the personal exemption cannot cover any 
processing “accessible to an indefinite number of people”202 would if strictly interpreted lead to the 
conclusion that even if an individual was publishing only information exclusively about themselves 
they may have a legal requirement, for example, to ensure the accuracy of the data,203 register the 
processing with the DPA authority204 and even in some circumstances obtain the DPA’s authorization 
for processing.205  However, even the most stringent DPAs implicitly accept that the personal 
exemption covers all processing of information exclusively about the individual him or herself and 
that it can in principle shield an individual in relation to processing carried out not only by them 
directly but also on their behalf.  Many, including the Working Party itself,206 go much further and 
advocate the general right to pseudonymous profiles on social networking sites despite the fact that, 
in circumstances when data protection law applies in full, this would almost inevitably conflict with 
the requirement for every controller to disclose their real identity to data subjects at least when 
collecting information directly from them.207   The broader range of activity referred to in recital 18 
of the GDPR compared to recital 12 of the current Directive – notably the addition of “social 
networking and online activity” – must also be recognized.  However, not only does this recital 
pointedly only state that “personal and household activities could [not must] include … social 
networking and on-line activity undertaken within the context of [personal or household] activities” 
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but a decision was made to maintain the reference only to “purely” personal or household activity in 
the normative part of the Regulation, in full recognition that this term has been consistently 
narrowly construed by the CJEU from Lindqvist to Ryneš.208 
 Ultimately, the need to avoid outcomes which are clearly disproportionate and unfairly 
chilling of self-expression points to a strong case to effect an expansion of the personal exemption 
even into the area of individual publication of third party information.  At the same time, it must be 
recognised that recent Charter-influenced CJEU jurisprudence outlined above emphasizes that data 
protection’s core purposes require that a strict construction of the personal exemption be 
maintained as regards the processing of personal data which is clearly “liable to infringe 
fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy”.209   Given this, the personal exemption should 
be reinterpreted to exclude individual publication from data protection law but only so long as the 
publication in question does not pose a serious prima facie risk of infringing the core privacy, 
reputation and related rights which data protection is dedicated to safeguard.210  At the least, such a 
construction would completely exclude individual liability in relation to the sort of “harmless”, not 
“annoying” or not “offensive” publications mentioned within the ʻmid-rangeʼ guidance of the Danish, 
Greek and Swedish DPAs explored above.211   On the other hand, publication which is prima facie 
ʻoffensiveʼ due, for example, to its pejorative nature (e.g. a clearly negative review of a teacher, sole 
trader or even personal acquaintance), its disclosure of private details concerning personal life 
(especially if related to sensitive categories of data such as criminality, sex or health life) and/or 
because of an incessant and focused observation which amounts to a potentially unwarranted form 
of surveillance would rightly continue to fall outside this absolute exemption. 
 
5.3 – Limited Derogations Safeguarding Freedom of Expression 
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 Notwithstanding both a broadened approach to the personal exemption and a generous 
interpretation of the special expressive purposes derogation, a good deal of individual publication 
would continue to fall outside both provisions.  Whilst some instances of this kind of publication are 
manifestly unwarranted,212 many others instantiate forms of self-expression and the freedom to 
converse which are in principle of legitimate value.   Thus, Daphne Kellner notes that: 
A tweet about a dishonest car mechanic, a Yelp review of a botched medical procedure, or a 
post criticizing an individual Etsy or Amazon vendor may not be covered [by the special 
expressive purposes derogation] … This kind of material is a far cry from the privileged – and 
often professionalized and even licensed – categories of expression listed in Article 85.2.   
But it is precisely this democratic cacophony that makes the Internet so different from prior 
speech platforms.  Without clear free expression protections … this speech is at risk.213 
Notwithstanding contrary suggestions in much of the DPA guidance considered above, 
communications such as these would clearly be unduly censored if only permitted with the 
identified individual’s consent.  Moreover, even if such a stringent interpretation of the law was 
rejected, these forms of publication would still be inappropriately chilled if required to adhere in full 
to data protection’s general rules and disciplining provisions, not least since stipulations such as 
detailed requirements for transparency notices, for the registration or documentation data 
processing and for ensuring specific contractual arrangements with data processors imply “expertise 
and resources which are typically only available to organisations”214 and, therefore, go beyond the 
capacity which can reasonably be expected in the context of personal activity (even if connected to 
the indeterminate dissemination of information).   On the other hand, given that the identified 
individual’s rights may be very significantly engaged by such content and in the absence of the 
strong public interest rationale which undergirds lawful special expressive purposes activity, data 
protection law rightly gives emphasis to ensuring that this individual is properly safeguarded.   In 
sum, therefore, what appears necessary is for the law to encapsulate a new type of balancing of 
rights and interests which (in contrast to that required by the special expressive purposes 
derogation) also guarantees the subject’s core substantive and supervisory data protection rights. 
 In principle, Directive 95/46 includes general derogatory clauses which recognize that the 
protection of freedom of expression as well as other “rights and freedoms”215 may require such a 
crafting of such a middle area between the deployment of the special expressive purposes 
derogation216 and the full application of data protection’s default provisions.  However, these 
clauses, which were outlined in sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2 above, have two serious drawbacks.  In the 
first place, they are officially styled as optional217 and, as a result, have rarely been deployed by 
Member States in the free speech area.  Secondly, they fail to include within their scope a number of 
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the law’s problematic provisions including detailed rules on overseas data transfer,218 contractual 
relationships between controllers and processors219 and the requirement to register and/or 
document data processing activities.220   Nevertheless, notwithstanding the general failure to deploy 
these clauses in formal law, the CJEU signalled early on in the Lindqvist case that both “authorities 
and courts” had a duty in certain cases outside of special expression to explicitly interpret data 
protection with regard for freedom of expression.221  Turning to the DPA questionnaire, the need for 
such an explicit weighing or balancing through interpretation was recognized by 60% of authorities 
in the case of the amateur ʻcelebrity gossipʼ blogger and almost one third in the case of the social 
networker photo ʻtaggerʼ scenarios (see Charts 1 and 2).  However, as argued in sub-section 5.1 
above, in light of the its subject matter, the blog would appear to fit better within the more forgiving 
special expressive purposes derogation.  Moreover, the logic presented in sub-section 5.2 above 
would suggest that the social networker scenario might actually fit within the personal exemption, 
although clearly this would depend at least on the nature of the photo at issue.222  Turning to the 
DPA website review, almost no regulator’s published guidance set out a non-special purposes 
interpretative balance outside of the kind of essentially ʻinoffensiveʼ publication which, as argued 
above, should fall within the personal exemption.223    Thus, although the Lindqvist dicta is clearly 
helpful as far as it goes, these facts highlight one of its key difficulties, namely, that it remains 
uncertain when DPAs (or indeed courts) will accept that it does indeed apply.  It is also unclear 
whether the Lindqvist instruction should lead (in appropriate circumstances) to whole sections of the 
law, such as the rules as regards transparency or sensitive data, being disapplied or whether, to the 
contrary, it can only result in already open-textured or clearly non-fundamental elements of the law 
being given a particular gloss.  In any case, even if Lindqvist does mandate radical interpretative 
surgery, the fact that the statutory law itself fails to provides for the necessary balance sits in strong 
tension with the need for limitations on freedom of expression (and indeed other fundamental 
rights) to be “provided for by law” (as per the EU Charter)224 or “prescribed by law” (as per the 
European Convention).225 
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 As noted in section 4.2 above, similarly to the existing Directive, the GDPR also contains 
general clauses explicitly allowing for (but not mandating) derogations to be made outside of the 
special expressive purposes but in the interests of freedom of expression.  In sum, under article 23, 
derogations may be made from the transparency rules and certain data subject rights, together with 
the data protection principles in so far as these correspond to these detailed rules and rights, so long 
as any restrictions are made by way of a legislative measure, respect the “essence of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms” and are a “necessary and proportionate measure in democratic 
society to safeguard” inter alia “the rights and freedoms of others”.  Rather more restrictively, 
derogations may also generally be made from the sensitive data regime on the basis of a law which 
respects the essence to the right to data protection, provides for “suitable and specific measures to 
safeguard the rights and the interests of the data subject” and applies to processing which is 
“necessary for reasons of substantial public interest”.226  (As regards data relating to criminal 
convictions and offences only, the GDPR states that it is simply necessary for the law to set down 
“appropriate safeguards”.)227  However, no derogatory provision covers the data protection 
principles in and of themselves,228 the need for a legal basis for processing229 and the discipline 
provisions including the overseas transfer rules,230 the requirement to document data processing,231 
to establish arrangements where a joint controller situation arises232 and to comply with detailed 
requirements as regards the engagement of a data processor.233  It is therefore clear that, from the 
point of view of facilitating the kind of balance under discussion here, these provisions suffer from 
similar drawbacks to the cognate provisions in the existing Directive and, once the generally more 
stringent default nature of the GDPR is taken into account, one of a more serious nature. 
 On the other hand, as likewise outlined in sub-section 4.2, the GDPR also contains a clause 
additional to the special expressive purposes derogation stating that “Member States shall by law 
reconcile the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation with the right to 
freedom of expression and information”.234  Whilst unfortunately lacking any further specification, 
this clause does clearly require Member States to use the derogations available elsewhere in the 
GDPR in order to pass discrete legislation giving effect to this need for balance.  However, in two 
further respects this clause is at least extremely opaque and potentially very restrictive.  Firstly, 
given that, in contrast to the special expressive purposes derogation which immediately follows,235 it 
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does not set out any special vires,236 it is unclear whether it grants Member States an ability to grant 
necessary derogations here even if they are not otherwise permitted under the GDPR.  Secondly, it is 
not clear whether this clause mandates (or even allows for) DPAs (and courts) to grant derogations 
here in the absence of a specific Member State law setting these out. 
 Taking these two issues in turn, it is clear that the use by Member States only of derogation 
vires otherwise available in the GDPR will as explored above still lead to a disproportionate burden 
being placed on individuals.  On the other hand, the deliberate absence of express additional vires 
must be acknowledged.  In light of this dilemma, it seems appropriate to recognise the existence of 
implied vires here but to interpret these narrowly and strictly.237  In sum, derogations made under 
this clause should not undermine either the substantive or supervisory essence of European data 
protection’s general derogatory scheme.  Thus, at a substantive level, no derogation should be 
possible from the need for a legal basis for processing238 or from the data protection principles in 
and of themselves.239  Turning to sensitive data, so long as a purposive rather than literal 
interpretation of this concept is adopted,240 it may be thought that a rule mandating consent here is 
not inappropriate.241  However, this would overlook particular circumstances when publication 
absent consent may be warranted.  For example, an accurate and not manifestly unfair (albeit clearly 
negative) report on a sole trader such as a builder could very easily at least imply criminal activity 
such as fraud or health difficulties which rendered that person incapable of performing their task 
effectively.  In any case, it seems unlikely that the GDPR’s definition of consent242 including in 
particular its mandatory and categorical rescinability243 is generally appropriate in a self-expressive 
context.   Given this, broadly paralleling the ʻpublic interestʼ derogations from the sensitive data 
rules set down elsewhere in GDPR,244 exceptions here should in each particular case require strong 
justification and a heightened responsibility from the controller to safeguard the remaining rights of 
the data subject.    As regards the discipline provisions such as documentation and arrangements for 
joint controllers and/or processors, both the instrumental, as opposed to intrinsic purposes of these 
provisions, and the near certainty of a disproportionate outcome if these were fully applied in this 
context must be recognised.  Given this, individuals should only be subject to the general security 
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requirements245 found within the data protection principles themselves.246   On the other hand, 
moving to the supervisory provisions, in light of the GDPR’s data protection principle’s new focus on 
controller accountability247 and the lack of effective redress for serious problems highlighted in 
section 2.2, there is no case for exempting this activity from ultimate DPA oversight. 248  For much 
the same reason, it is also essential that data subjects retain an ability to take action to bring illegal 
publication relating to them to an end, as well secure compensation for any damage suffered as a 
result.249 
 Turning to the second issue, the clause’s reference to Member States proactively taking 
action “by law” in this area and the CJEU’s general insistence that domestic constitutional provisions 
should not in and of themselves trump provisions in EU law250 both point to a requirement that 
Member States adopt specific legislation giving effect to the freedom of expression clause in this 
area.  This legislation251 should provide that private individuals processing for their own expressive 
purposes (but outside both the household exemption and the special expressive purposes 
derogation) should only be subject to a minimum of substantive and supervisory data protection 
requirements such as those set out above.252  Nevertheless, especially given the freedom of 
expression clause’s problematic lack of specificity, it must be recognised that some Member States 
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will either not legislate at all or will only provide for excessively restrictive derogations.253  In these 
circumstances, the need to interpret this clause as consistently as possible with respect for human 
rights should be recognised as overriding.  Given this, DPAs (and courts) should draw on the general 
human rights standards present in each of the Member States to achieve a broadly cognate 
outcome.   However, such a result would remain highly imperfect since, as with the current Lindqvist 
dicta, uncertainty about legal requirements would continue.  This would result in tension not only 
with the GDPR’s freedom of expression clause itself but also with overarching rule of law 
requirements set out in both the EU Charter and the European Convention. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 Not only European data protection law itself but also the DPAs who act as its “guardians”254 
are charged with ensuring the “effective and complete protection of data subjects, in particular of 
their right to privacy”.255  This task has inevitably come into increasing tension with actors who 
publish (in the sense of disseminating to an indeterminate number) personal information relating to 
others.  With the dramatic growth from the 2000s onwards firstly of blogs and then of social 
networking, these actors now include many millions of private individuals.   Such individual 
publication poses an unprecedented interpretative challenge.  This article sought to systematically 
investigate how DPAs in all 31 EEA Member States have responded to this and, from this uniquely 
comprehensive empirical base, consider how law and regulation may best evolve in the new era of 
the GDPR. 
 The article’s empirical survey focused on both a questionnaire of EEA DPAs (answered by 
approximately three quarters of national regulators) and a systematic review of guidance on this 
issue on their websites (which was found in almost 60% of cases).  The data gathered indicated that 
regulators have generally adopted a strict interpretation of the law here, with almost all holding that 
that any publication of third party personal information falls outside the law’s personal exemption.  
Moreover, not only do most regulators hold that publication in the general social networking 
context requires full compliance with default data protection, but approximately half even state that 
such activity requires data subject consent.  Even when individual publication is targeted towards 
the collective public, many DPAs are reluctant to apply the special expressive purposes derogation 
unless this activity is clearly akin to that of professional journalism.  On the other hand, a number of 
DPAs do explicitly seek to apply data protection with regard for freedom of expression in context of 
individual publication, and a few have even adopted the extreme position of seeking to exempt 
individuals from responsibility in this area entirely.  Nevertheless, on the whole, DPA interpretations 
appear, at least theoretically, to impose unreasonable and disproportionate burdens on individual’s 
free expression rights here and, due to their severe disjuncture with social realities, run the risk of 
ʻhaving a domesticʼ with vast swathes of individuals online. 
 Looking to the future, the GDPR provides an opportunity to develop a more consistent, 
reasonable and realistic approach, taking into account both competing rights and also the limited 
capabilities which can reasonably be expected of private individuals.  Firstly, building on recital 18, 
the interpretation of the personal exemption should be expanded to cover instances of individual 
publication which do not pose a serious prima facie risk of infringing the core rights – for example to 
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privacy and reputation - which data protection is dedicated to upholding.  Secondly, in line with 
Recital 153’s recognition of need to interpret the special expressive purposes derogation256 
“broadly”,257 private individuals should not be discriminated against on account of a lack of 
professional status.  Instead, any individual activity which aims to disseminate a message to the 
collective public, whether of an academic, artistic, journalistic or literary nature, should fall within 
this permissive but not unqualified derogation.  Third, individual publication which is concerned only 
or at least very predominantly with self-expression and a general freedom to converse should be 
protected by the Regulation’s new freedom of expression clause.  This clause should also provide for 
a balancing of rights whilst also guaranteeing adherence to data protection’s core substantive and 
supervisory provisions.  Such a tripartite reconciliation of the law with competing rights and 
capabilities here would contextually integrate individual publication into the data protection 
framework.  The next task would be to make such integration effective in practice, an undertaking 
which surely must involve engagement not only with individuals themselves but also with the 
services which facilitate (and often mould and aggregate) their publication activities.  Whilst the 
scale of the challenge this all presents could hardly be over-estimated, anything less would fail to do 
justice to Europe’s twin commitments to upholding both freedom of expression and the right to the 
protection of personal data in an ever more complex digital age. 
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Appendix:  Quantitative Data From EEA DPA Questionnaire and Website Review 
N.B.  Values in brackets signify a quasi-standard response imputed from the DPA’s free-text answer.  
They are not included in Charts One and Two above which are based on the standard responses 
only. 
 
DPA Questionnaire Scenarios  
(A – D scale) 
DPA Website 
Individual Publication 
Guidance 
(1 – 3 scale)  Blogger Social Networker 
Austria (C) D Uncoded 
Belgium B D 3 
Bulgaria A A - 
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Croatia - - - 
Cyprus D D 3 
Czech Republic C D 1 
Denmark - - 2 
Estonia B D 3 
Finland B (A) 1 
France C D 3 
Germany - Federal C C - 
Germany - Brandenburg B B - 
Germany - Mecklenburg C D - 
Germany – Rhineland-Pfaltz (B) C - 
Germany - Schleswig-
Holstein C D 3 
Gibraltar A A - 
Greece C C 2 
Hungary C D - 
Iceland - - 1 
Ireland C C 1 
Italy B C 3 
Latvia C D 3 
Liechtenstein C C - 
Lithuania C C Uncoded 
Luxembourg C D 3 
Malta B A 3 
Netherlands - - 2 
Norway - - 3 
Poland C (A) - 
Portugal C D - 
Romania - - - 
Slovakia A (A) - 
Slovenia (Midpoint) A 1 
Spain - - 3 
Spain - Catalonia C C 2 
Sweden (B) (C) 2 
UK - - 1 
 
